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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM ANDREWS,
Petitioner-Appellant,:
-vsLAWRENCE MORRIS, As Warden of
the Utah State Prison,
Respondent-Appellee,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal from an order of the Third
Judicial District Court, Hon. James S. Sawaya, dismissing
Appellant's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, which
claimed that Appellant was confined under a sentence of
death imposed in violation of the Constitution of the
United States.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Court below granted Respondent's Motion to
Dismiss the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus without
argument or a hearing, and denied Petitioner's Motion for
a Stay of Execution pending a hearing on his Writ.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant weeks to have this Court reverse the
District Court's order dismissing his Petition for a Writ
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of Habeas Corpus without a hearing and to remand the case
to the District Court for further proceedings in which
Appellant would have the opportunity to present arguments
and evidence in support of his constitutional claims, and
to gra11L a stay of execution pending completion of those
proceedings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 2, 1978, the Supreme Court of the United
States declined to review this Court's affirmance of the
death sentence imposed on Appellant William Andrews.

On

November 3, 1978, the Second Judicial District Court of
Utah entered an order resentencing Appellant to be
executed on December 7, 1978.
On November 16, 1978, a Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, and an Application for Stay of Execution pending
a hearing on that Petition, was filed on Appellant's
behalf in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County.

On November 24, 1978, Respondent filed a Motion

to Dismiss that Petition.

That motion was not received

by counsel for Appellant until November 27, 1978--at the
same time Appellant's counsel informed Respondent that
Appellant would be filing an amended petition for habeas
corpus.

On November 28, 1978, that amended petition was

filed and served.

On November 29, 1978, both parties

appeared before the Hon. James

s.

Sawaya for a hearing

on Appellant's motion; at that time Respondent indicated
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it had no objection to Appellant's filing of the Amended
Petition, and Appellant agreed that Respondent's motion
to dismiss previously filed could be deemed a response to
the Amended Petition.

At the same time, counsel for

Respondent for the first time indicated that they would
ask to have their motion to dismiss brought on immediately.
By order of the Court, the entire matter was set over
until November 30, 1978, the next day.
Also on November 29, 1978, in hearing on the same
calendar, a Motion for Stay was heard and granted by
Judge Sawaya in a similar capital case, Dunsdon v. Morris,
No. 78-7012.

In that case an evidentiary hearing was

asked for and scheduled on one of the exact issues raised
by Appellant's Petition: the pattern of arbitrariness and
discrimination in death sentencing under the present
Utah law.

No motion to dismiss was made in that case by

Respondent; instead, the parties there agreed to a hearing
on the question and set a discovery schedule pending that
hearing.
On November 30, 1978, the parties in this case again
appeared before Judge Sawaya for a hearing on the motions.
At that hearing Respondent began by arguing that the
Petition should be dismissed because it did not raise
"a single significant fact or case which was not known or
should have been known .

. on October the 2nd, 1978 when
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the United States Supreme Court denied the Petition for
Cert in this case."

Trans. 11/30/78 at 4.

Respondent

urged that unless Appellant's counsel could "point out
what significant facts and

w~at

significant law has

occurred from the time that the Amended Appellant's
Briefs were filed in the Utah Supreme Court" the Petition
should be summarily dismissed without a hearing on its
merits.

Id. at 4-5.

In response, counsel for Appellant

sought to point out to the Court that "there are significant new developments of fact or law which have occurred
since the taking of the appeal in this case"
required a hearing.

Id. at 6.

which

Counsel cited four United

States Supreme Court decisions, and two cases pending
before the Court, which significantly affected the issues
raised by these Petitions and which had never been considered
by the Utah Courts.

Id. at 6-8.

Appellant's counsel further

pointed out to the Court certain factual matters which
could not have been presented and raised during his trial
and direct appeal: the actual prejudicial impact on the
jurors of publicity surrounding his case and communications
to the jurors during trial; and the pattern of death
sentencing that had emerged since William Andrews' trial
which showed his sentence to have been imposed arbitrarily
and discriminatorily.

Id. at 9-12.

because of these new developments

Counsel concluded that,
of law and fact which
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could not have been injected into the direct appeal process,
the issues raised by this Petition could not properly be
deemed determined by dispositions in the direct appeal
process.

Ibid.

Counsel specifically pointed out that the

direct appeal process was limited to its own record (Id. at
27), and alleged that at an evidentiary they could show
discrimination in the application of the Utah death penalty
law which could not have been established at any earlier
time (Id. at 17).
After hearing this argument, and without taking
evidence or bringing the trial record before him, Judge
Sawaya dismissed the Petition and denied the stay of
execution.

See Order of November 30, 1978.

Three days

later he entered findings and conclusions on that order,
holding that "no developments of fact or law

~aterial

to

the determination of the legality or constitutlonality of
the conviction and sentence of the Petitioner herein have
occurred since the filing of Petitioner's direct appeal to
the Utah Supreme Court," that "[a]ll the issues regarding
the constitutionality of the processes for death sentencing
under Utah law . . . and the affect of any alleged prejudicial
publicity or influences on Petitioner's trial" were
"raised in his direct appeal" "or could have been raised,"
and that"Petitioner's claim that Utah's death penalty law
has been applied arbitrarily and discriminatorily fails to
state a claim on which relief could be granted or on which
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a hearing need be held .
at 1.

Findings and Conclusions

From those rulings Appellant appealed to this Court,

and on December 4, 1978, was granted a stay of execution
pending this appeal.
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ARGUt-!ENT
POINT I
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULES OF THIS COURT REQUIRE
THAT POST CONVICTION RELIEF BE AVAILABLE TO PERSONS CmJFINED
UNDER SENTENCES IMPOSED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSITIUTION.
In Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965), the Supreme
Court suggested, but did not decide, that "the Fourteenth
Amend~ent

requires that the States afford State prisoners some

adequate corrective process for the hearing and determination
of claims of violation of federal constitutional guarantees."
381 U.S.

at 337.

Concurring Justices of the Court noted that

its previous decisions "articulated the principle that the
States must afford prisoners some 'clearly defined method by
which they may raise claims of denial of federal rights.'"
Ibid.

(concurring opinion of Justice Clark) • quoting Young v.

Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 239 (1949).

They

p::;~~-t-J

ou':: the

desirable attributes of a State postconviction procedure should reduce the
necessity for exercise of federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction. The procedure should
be swift and siwple and easily invoked.
It should be sufficiently comprehensive
to embrace all federal constitutional
claims.
In light of Fay v. Noia, (372
u.s. 391 (1963)
. . it should eschew
rigid and technical doctrines of
.
forfeiture waiver or default . . . 1t
should pro~ide for full fact hearings to
resolve disputed factual issues, and for
co~pilation of the record to_a~low federal
courts to determine the suff1c1ency_of
those hearings . . . it should prov1de for
decisions supported by opinions or ~act
findings and conclusions of law, wh1ch
disclose the grounds of decision and the
resolution of disputed facts.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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case v. Nebraska, supra at 381 U.S. 346-347 (concurring
opinion of Justice Brennan)

(citations and footnotes omitted.

The Justices emphasized that the

availability of such

pro-

cedures "will stop the rising conflict presently being generated between federal and state courts."

Id. at 381

U.S. 340

(Justice Clark), 344-346 (Justice Brennan).
In 1969 this Court adopted Rule 65B(i) which provides,
in part, that
Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary
or county jail under a committment of any
court
whether such imprisonment be under an
original co~~ittment or under a
committrnent for violation of probation
or parole, who asserts that in any
proceedings which resulted in his
committrnent there was s substantial
denial of his rights under the Constitution
of the United States or of the State of
Utah, or both, may institute a proceeding
under this rule.
This rule on its face creates the kind of post conviction
relief in the state courts the Supreme Court said was
desireable in Case.

It places no conditions on the right

to bring the action it creates, except to require that
"All claims of the denial of any of the complainant's
constitutional rights shall be raised in the post conviction
proceeding brought under this rule.

"URCP65B(i)

(4).

It permits the petitioned court to dismiss a complaint
challenging the constitutionality of a committment which has
"already been adjudged in a prior habeas corpus or other
similar proceeding;•

but makes no provision for dismissal

Sponsored
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pleaded complaint.

URCP 65B(i}

(2).

In short, the Rule

entitles a person confined in aleged violation of the constitution to challenge his confinement through a single comprehensive petition raising his claimed right to be free.
This does not mean that a prisoner may relitigate
through post conviction proceedings the self same issues
decided against him in his direct appeal, or that criminal
defendants may bypass issues in appealing their convictions
and hold them in reserve for post conviction proceedings.
In criminal cases as in all matters,
The rule of law is wise in that it
gives finality to judgments and also
conserves the time of courts, in that
courts should not be required to
relitigate matters which have once been
fully and finally determined.
Richardson v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044, 1046
(1971).

And litigants in criminal cases as in all others,

may intentionally waive and abandon a claim of constitutional
right, and be barred from raising it again.
If a habeas applicant, after consultation
with competent counsel or otherwise,
understandingly and knowingly forewent
the privilege of seeking to vindicate
his federal claims in the state courts,
whether for strategic, tactical, or any
other reasons that could fairly be
described as the deliberate by-passing
of state procedures,
he may be held to have waived his rights and precluded from
raising them in collateral attacks.
4 391

( 1 963)
- •

Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,

But absent such a prior adjudication or

dclib<:oratc \·t«iver, neither the rules governing post conviction
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1

relief not the principle of collateral estoppel

governing

serial litigations preclude a Utah prisoner from applying for
relief from alleged unconstitutional confinement.
Dicta in this Court's decisions since the passage of
Rule 65B(i) have properly emphasized "the error of attempting
to use such a writ as a substitute for the prescribed appeal
procedure."

Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108, 1109 (1977).

But the Court has not curtailed the availability of the writ
"where the requirements of the law have been so ignored or
distorted that the party is substantially and effectively
denied what is included in the term due process of law."
Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121, 122-123 (1967).
It has noted its awareness of the expanding concepts of due
process and the availability of habeas corpus.

(See id. at 123

n.5) And though it has continued to caution against the use of
habeas corpus proceedings to raise issues that could be raised
on direct appeal, both this court and the lower courts it has
affirmed have nonetheless reached the merits even of issues that
clearly could have been raised on appeal where they are of constitutional dimension.

See, eg.,

Ra~mell

v. Smith, supra;

1 The rule of collateral estoppel governs "situations
like this wherein issues which are actually decided
against a party in prior action may be relied upon
by an opponent in a later case as having been judicially
established." Richardson v. Hodson, supra at 485 P.2d
1046.
"The estoppel applies only to issues actually
litigated and not to those which could have been determined."
Ibid.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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Horne v. Turner, 29 Utah 2d 175, 506 P.2d 1268 (1973);
Zumbrunnen v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 428, 497 P.2d 34, 35 (1972).
It has held that where "there has been such unfairness or
failure to accord due process that it would be wholly unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction" habeas corpus will lie.
Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah 1978).
Appellant submits that where, as here, a man is being
sent to die and claiming he was not given a fair trial and was
denied his constitutional rights, it would be unconscionable not
to examine the merit of his claims.
Moreover, it would be unjustifiable.

To hold, as the

District Courts did in this case, that the possibility that an
issue could have previously been raised on appeal absolutely
and finally bars its assertion on habeas corpus, would be to
ignore the plain provisions of URCP 65B(i), to leave prisoners
confined in violation of constitutional rights they have not
waived without a state remedy, and to force them into federal
court without even a hearing in a court in Utah.

No purpose

could possibly be served by such an absolute and inflexible
bar.

The state's interest in finality of judgments is fully

satisfied by this Court's rule permitting and requiring constitutional challenges to confinement to be raised in a single post
conviction petition.

Rule 65B(i}

(4).

Judicial efficiency is

protected by the rule of collateral estoppel, which forecloses
the raising of issues previously adjudicated in a case involving
a party raising them.

See Richardson v. Hodson, supra.

But
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expansion of that rule to declare waived and bar from Utah
courts any constitutional claim which conceivably could have
been raised at the time of the appeal--whether or not the
defendant there made any knowing waiver, whether or not the
law or the facts on which the claim is based was known or
established at the time--simply erases the remedy Rule 65B(.i)
provides, and forces prisoners to challenge their confinement,
ann the State to defend it, in federal court.
The District Court here erred in failing to determine
which of Appellant's constitutional claims were new, whether
any of them had been waived, and which of them were based on
new facts or law not available at the time of his direct appeal.
Its summary dismissal of this petition, forcing Appellant out
of the Utah courts without a hearing on the facts or la\v he
asserts, should be reversed.

POINT II
A COURT CANNOT PROPERLY DETE£-!INE THAT AN ISSUE IS FORECLOSED BY A PRIOR DECISION WITHOUT FINDING FACTS AND HAVING THE
ENTIRE RECORD OF PRIOR PROCEEDINGS BEFORE IT.
Rule 65B(i) (7) requires that prior to a hearing on a
post conviction relief petition, "the State or County shall
obtain such transcript of proceedings or court records as may
be relevant or material to the case."

In order to make a deter-

mination that the raising of an issue is foreclosed by the doctrine of res judicata, a trial court must have the entire record
of the prior proceeding before it.

See Parris v. La,-tnnCity corP·
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542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975).

Such reference to the prior record

is necessary because a determination that a matter is foreclosed
by a prior decision requires a determination of fact; it cannot
be made from the face of the pleadings before the court.

For

that reason, a motion claiming that one lawsuit should be dismissed
because it is barred by the decision in another is not a motion
under URCP 12 (b) ·but a matter for summary judgment under Rule
56 since it requires examination of materials and facts beyond
the pleadings. See Vance v. Heath, 42 Utah 148, 129 P. 365 (1912);
Escalante Co. v. Kent, 79 Utah 26, 7 P.2d 276 (1932).

Those

matters must include the entire record of the prior proceeding,
so that it can be determined exactly what was in fact decided
there.

Parrish v. Layton City Corp., supra.
Habeas corpus proceedings are civil, and are governed

by the rules of civil procedure in Utah.
is one of the most basic rules of civil

URCP 65B(i) (6).
F~~~~lce

motion to dismiss raises "matters outslde : .. co

It

that, when a

<=~eading

the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided

in Rule 56."

URCP 12(b) (6).

It is

error to deny the parties the opportunity to fully present
evidence and contest the factual allegations on which the
motion is based.
It is error to consider a motion_to
dismiss as a motion for summary JUdgment
without giving the adverse ~arty an
.
opporutnity to present pert~nent mater1al.
Str-.:1nd v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191,
193 (Uteth 1977) ·

It l·s error for a trial court to convert a

rnotion
dismiss
intoFunding
a motion
orServices
to
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require the plaintiff to state "how he will establish his
claim .

Hill v. Grand Central Inc. 25 Utah 2d 121,

477 P.2d 150, 151 (1970); see Harvey v. s.mders, 534 P.2d
905 (Utah 1975); Beacons Bar V Ranch v. Utah Farm Productions,
587 P.2d 151 (Utah 1978).

And it is clear error for a

court to make a factual determination concluding a case
without having the pertinent evidentiary materials before it.
In this case the District Court made all these errors.
It rejected that Appellant's specific allegation that the
death penalty was being imposed on him for reasons not
permissible under the Constitution (Trans. ll/30/78 at 28)
and that the death penalty was being administered
"arbitrarily and discriminatorily against the poor and
outcast whose alleged victims are white"

(Petition at 8),

without conducting any evidentiary inquiry into whether
those allegations were true.

It held that Appellant could

and should have proven at his trial or on his direct appeal
that the jury in his case was actually affected and
prejudiced by improper outside influences, without examining
the record to see whether, as he claimed, it was impossible
for him to establish those facts at trial.
ll/30/78 at 9.

See Trans.

It accepted representations by counsel

regarding the significance of the verdicts at trial (see
Id. at 22) without looking into the whole record to
determine whether, in fact, those verdicts had that
significance.

And it ruled that substantial claims of
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constitutional rights violations were not available to
Appellant, without determining from any record whether he
had personally waived them or whether his counsel had in
any previous proceeding been afforded the opportunity to
assert them.
The kind of dismissal that the District Court
entered in this case is specifically reserved by the rules
of civil procedure for pleadings which on their face fail
to state a cause of action.

A ruling that necessarily

goes beyond the face of the pleadings cannot be made in
the manner in which the District Court acted.
Parties bringing a lawsuit proper on its face are
entitled to an opportunity to present these necessary
materials and arguments to the court before their case is
dismissed.

The District Court afforded

opportunity to present his evidence and

Appel~ant

~-

no

~:·~~='·

Accordingly, the determinations made by the District Court
were factually and legally wrong, both in the manner it
reached them and in the result reached.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

POINT III
NEW DEVELOPMENTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW WHICH ARE RETROACTIVE TO PRIOR CASES CAN PROPERLY PROVIDE THE BASIS
FOR HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF.
The position of the Respondent State of Utah below
was that new constitutional claims may not be raised on
habeas corpus unless "new issues of law or fact arise
that were not known at the time of appeal."

Memorandum

in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Petition at 9.
There was no dispute about the standard under existing
Utah law.

Trans. 11/30/78 at 6.

One of the essential

functions of the modern Writ is to raise newly emerged
constitutional issues after the opportunity to raise
them on appeal has passed.
391 (1963).

See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.

A mere failure to raise a point established

by constitutional case law in an appeal cannot foreclose
later reliance on that case law, unless the failure
constitutes a waiver or the law is new and non-retroactive.
"[W]aiver affecting federal rights is a federal
question," Fay v. Noia, supra at 372 U.S. 439, and under
that law a constitutional waiver must be"an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege."

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464

(1938).

A right not yet established by controlling case law

can

hardly be deemed "known" or "abandoned intentionally" by
a lawyer's failure to foresee it.

The course of
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constitutional decision making seldom runs smooth, and
its forks and turns are seldom easy to anticipate.
Especially

in the death penalty area "[t)he signals

from [the Supreme) Court have not . .

always been easy

to decipher," and the Court's decisions have "engendered
confusion as to what was required in order to impose
the death penalty in accord with the Eighth Amendment."
Lockett v. Ohio,

U.S. ___ , 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 986-988,

98 S.Ct. 2954 (1978).

Counsel can hardly fairly be

deemed to have "intentionally" waived constitutional
issues in this area by not mentioning them before
are recognized by the Courts.

they

Moreover, even if counsel

could be held so accountable, a defendant himself cannot-and a federal constitutional waiver must be a personal
one.

"A choice made by counsel not

parti~ipated

the Petitioner does not automaticall; nalater proceedings.

~~,,

in by
in

Fay v. Noia, supra at 372 U.S. 439.

A constitutional claim not waived should be
available in any case to which it applies, unless that
case arose before the principle was announced and the
principle is declared non-retroactive.

The District

Court's decision in this case in effect held that the new
constitutional case law on which Appellant was relying
was not retroactive to cases past the stage of direct appeal.
But retroactivity of new constitutional decisions is itself
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a matter of federal law to be determined by considering the
nature of the right involved, policies affected by its
enforcement, and the stage of the proceedings at which it
is invoked.

See Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233,

241-243 (1977).

Where, as here, the constitutional doctrine

announced touches the "truth-finding function" rather
than some evidentiary rule aimed at influencing actions in
future cases, it presumably is retroactive.

Ibid.

The

District Court here gave no reason why the decisions
Appellant cited should not be considered retroactive to
his case, and indeed apparently did not even examine them.
Its summary rejection of new law that could not have been
injected into this case at any earlier stage was error.

POINT IV
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS THAT THE UTAH DEATH PENALTY LAWS ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON THEIR FACE WERE BASED ON NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS WHICH ARE APPLICABLE HERE.
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) and its
companion cases,

the Supreme Court upheld three death

penalty statutes, struck down two, and emphasized that
the constitutionality of "each distinct system must be
examined on an individual basis."

428 U.S. at 195.

In

State v. Pierre,572 P.2d 1338, 1356 (Utah 1977) this
Court "acknowledge[d] that Utah's system, applicable to
defendant, differs in some respects from those systems in
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Georgia, Florida and Texas

u.s.

In Gilmore v. Utah,

, 97 S.Ct. 436 (1976) though the Court did

not reach the substantive issue, three Supreme Court
Justices expressed "obvious, serious doubts about the
validity of the [Utah] state statute" and a fourth deemed
them "not insubstantial".

97 s.ct. at 439 (dissenting

opinions of Justices White, Brennan and Marshall), 440
(dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun).

In the two

years after Gilmore and after this Court heard argument
on these issues, the Supreme Court issued several further
capital punishments decisions which underscored the
reasons for those doubts.
In Gregg v. Georgia, and its companion cases, the
Supreme Court upheld three statutes that provided elaborate.
procedures to guard against the

arbitrar~~2=s

and discrim-

ination in death sentencing that Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 {1972) had condemned.

All three of the statutory

systems which Gregg cases unheld provided for bifurcated
trials on guilt and sentence.

In the sentencing proceeding

under each statute, the State was required to specifically
allege one or more "aggravating" facts which the law
specifically delineated, and which the State contended
justified imposition of the death penalty.

Under each

system the sentencing judge or jury had to find one or
more of these facts established--in addition to the facts
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which it had found in determining guilt--and to specify
the particular facts it found true in rendering a death
verdict.

"Aggravating" factors other than those listed

by statute could not support a sentence of death.

Appellate

review of specific "aggravating" factors found was provided
to insure that the sentence was both legal and in
proportion to the crime.

See Gregg v. Georgia, supra at

428 U.S. 196-212; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 269-274 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 249-253 (1976).
Supreme Court decisions since Gregg have highlighted
the importance of each of these features of the statutes
to their constitutional validity.

In (Harry) Roberts v.

Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977), a clear majority of the
Court held squarely that mere narrowing of the definition
of a capital crime is not enough to satisfy Furman where
adequate safeguards against jury arbitrariness are not
provided as well.

In Gardner v. Florida, 430

u.s.

349 (1977)

the Court re-emphasized the critical importance of
procedural safeguards at the sentencing stage.

Gardner

held that, because "death is a different kind of punishment
than any other which may be imposed in this country," a
death sentencing proceeding must satisfy the highest
"standards of procedural fairness" so that "any decision
to impose the death sentence [will) be, and appear to be,
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based on reason rather than caprice and emotion."
at 358

; see Id. at 430 U.S. 363

Justice White).

430 U.S.

(concurring opinion of

Specifically, Gardner invalidated the use

of secret information in capital sentencing which permitted
sentences to be imposed without the defendant having notice
of the specific allegations and the opportunity to contest
them, and without the sentencing authority making specific
findings to "disclose to the reviewing court the considerations which motivated the death sentence . . . . "
430

u.s.

361.

Id. at

Gardner stands for the proposition that a

system that permits the death sentence to be imposed
without giving open and specific and consistent reasons
cannot be sustained.

That holding was adhered to even more

recently in Presnell v. Georgia,
207

u.s.

I

58 L.Ed.2d

(1978) where the Court overturned a Georgia death

sentence affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court on aggravating
factors other than those specified in the jury verdict,
because such inconsistencies violated the kind of
"fundamental principles of procedural fairness

. at

the penalty phase of a trial in a capital case"

announced

in Gardner.

58 L.Ed.2d at 211.

Appellant's trial, and the Utah procedures under which
it was conducted, did not meet the standards set down by
these cases.

Though the hearing was bifurcated on trial

and sentencing, no factual findings were required at the
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sentencing phase; as in (Harry) Roberts and Woodson v.
North Carolina,

428 U.S. 280 (1976) the jury, having

convicted, was free to impose a death or life sentence
for reasons wholly outside those recognized by law.

Cf.

Woodson v. North Carolina, supra at 428 U.S. 302-303
Like the Petitioner in Gardner v. Florida, supra, Appellant
was given no notice by statute or information of the
specific grounds on which a death sentence would be sought
or could be based, and no such ground was ever specified
by the sentencing authority.

It is thus fully possible

that, like the Georgia Supreme Court in Presnell, this
Court's affirmance of Appellant's sentence on direct
appeal (see State v. Andrews, supra at 574 P.2d 711) was
based on reasons different from those which the jury found
determinative in making its decision.

Not even the most

basic due process notions, let alone the extraordinary
standards established by Gardner, are met by a system which
places no limit on the issues to be considered, requires no
pleading or proof of them beyond a reasonable doubt, and
makes no open finding of reasons for imposition of the
most extreme penalty.
These, briefly, were Appellant's claims against the
constitutionality of Utah death sentencing
his Petition below.

procedur~s

in

See Amended Petition at 4-8. In
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addition, the Petition contended that the particular
sentence imposed on William Andrews, "who has never been
alleged nor proven or found by any court or jury to have
personally taken life or intended to take life, is
constitutionally cruel and disproportionate to the crime
Id. at 9.

This claim was drawn from another

recent Supreme Court decision, that in Lockett v. Ohio,
supra.

In Lockett,

a concurring opinion neces-

sary to the decision of the majority held that "[b)ecause
it has been extremely rare that the death penalty has
been imposed upon those who were not found to have
intended the death of the victim" or "who did not personally
commit the nurder,"
it violates the Eighth Amendment to impose
the penalty of death without a finding that
the defendant possessed a purpose to ca~se
the death of the victim.
57 L. Ed. 2d at 1002.

Similarly, Appellant's Petition

alleged that the method of execution used in this State
"constitutes the purposeless infliction of pain through
means inconsistent with the evolving standards of decency
in the United States."

Amended Petition at 9.

This claim

was based on the Eighth Amendment rules of Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584

(1977), which held that

the Eighth Amendment bars not only those
punishments that are "barbaric" but also those
that are "excessive" . . .
[A) punishment is
"excessive" and unconstitutional if it (l) makes
no measurable contribution to acceptable goals
of punishment and hence is nothing more t~an the
purposelcs3 i~position of paln and suffer1ng, .or
(2) is grossly out of proportlon to the sever1ty
of the crime.
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433

u.s.

592.

Coker struck down the death penalty for rape

in part because that penalty had been rejected as too extreme by all states but Georgia, and had extremely rarely
been carried out in modern times anywhere.

433 U.S. 596-597.

In Lockett, Justice White followed Coker's principles and
based his decision that death must be reserved for intentional
killings partly on the fact that the death penalty applied
to unintended crimes "fails to significantly contribute to
acceptable, or, indeed,any perceptible goals of punishment."
57 L. Ed. 2d at 1002-1003.

Had Appellant been given the

hearing he requested on his claim against the method of
execution here (see Amended Petition at 9-10), he would
have sought to prove that execution by firing squad has
been rejected by all jurisdictions save Utah, and constitutes
the ''purposeless imposition of pain and suffering" which
serves no penal purpose but to satisfy certain doctrines
of the Mormon Church.

Such a showing would clearly have

brought his claim within the Eighth Amendment rules of Coker.
These new issues of law significantly affect the
constitutionality of the sentence imposed on Appellant
William Andrews.

They should be considered by the Utah

courts before the validity of that sentence is finally passed
upon.

The District Court should have considered them before

holding that the sentence had been conclusively upheld.
This Court should remand this case so that the courts can
consider them now.
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POINT V
A CLAIM THAT A PERSON HAS BEEN SENTENCED TO DEATH AS A
RESULT OF RACIAL DISCRH!INATION CANNOT BE DISMISSED AS A
MATTER OF LAI-J WITHOUT AN INQUIRY TO DETERMINE IF THAT
CLAIM IS TRUE.
The one issue raised by Appellant's Petition on which
the District Court reached the merits was the contention
that the death penalty is being imposed in Utah and in the
United States "rarely and arbitrarily and discriminatorily
against the poor and outcast whose alleged victims are
white," and almost exclusively in cases where the defendant
"is non-white, male, poor, and a stranger in the community
in "'hich he was tried."

Amended Petition at 8-9.

The

District Court ruled that this portion of the Petition
"fails to state a claim on which relief could be granted or
on which a hearing need be held .
Conclusions at 1.

The Court thus held,

• 2 Find~ngs and
i~

E~~er~,

that

Appellant was entitled to no relief whether or not his life
was being taken by the State, as he alleged, arbitrarily and
as the result of racial discrimination.

2 Judge Sawaya added in his written findings that "Petitioner
could & should have raised such issue on direct appeal" (Ibid.)
but it is clear that this alternative was not the basis of his
holding.
It was undisputed that the two petitioners before
the Court were the first persons sentenced to death under the
Utah law, and that they had had no prior opportunity to offer
evidence of discrimination in the appeal process.
Trans.
11/30/78 at 11, 29-30.
Judge Sawaya recognized this and
acknowledged that he "took the position that even though it was
not ar1 issue that was or could have been raised at the time of
direct appeal, that it was not an issue which had any merit."
Trans. of n 0 aring l2/l5/78 at 6, Codianna v. Morris, Utah Sup.
Ct.t,!o. 16187.
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The District Court made its rulings despite the fact
that the Petitioners before him clearly argued that the
death sentenced here were imposed "because of race and
because of arbitrary and capricious powers exercised by
prosecutors," and alluded to evidence they could offer to
support that claim.

Trans. ll/30/78 at 17.

It heard

neither this evidence nor legal argument from the Petitioners
in support.

Instead, it apparently relied on the Respondent's

arguments that there could be no constitutional challenge
to "prosecutorial discretion in charging a capital felony"
(Memo. Supporting Motion to Dismiss at 6), though Petitioners
made it clear that
We are not limiting our allegations to
pr~secutorial discretion but we are looking,
as ~he Court did in Furman, at the whole
system. People that go into it on capital
charges or potentially capital charges and
t~e people that come out with death sentences,
we are saying that there is no rhyme or reason
or, if there is any rhyme or reason, they are
reasons that are not permissible under the
Constitution of the United States.
Trans. 11/30/78 at 28.

Clearly, those allegations stated a

claim on which relief could and, if they were proven, would
have to be granted.
It is long since settled that the Constitution forbids
the discriminatory enforcement of a facially valid statute.
Though the law itself may be fair
face and impartial in appearance,
it is applied and administered by
authority with an evil eye and an

on its
yet, if
public
unequal
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hand, so as practically to make unjust an
illegal discriroinations between persons
in similar circumstances material to their
rights, denial of equal justice is still
within the prohibition of the constitution.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-374 (1886}.

For the

hundred years since that was decided it has been accepted
that a person penalized as part of a pattern of

discrimina~

tory law enforcement was entitled to judicial relief.

See,

e.g., Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935}; Shuttlesworth
v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969}; Allee v. Madrano. 416

u.s.

802 (1974).
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 236 (1972}, the Supreme

Court held that the imposition and carrying out of the death
penalty

u~ier

sentencing systems then in force violated the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments--because under those systems
"the penalty was being imposed discriminatorily, wantonly
and

freakis~ly,

and so infrequently that any given death

sentence was cruel and unusual."
153, 220-221 (1976).

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.

The Furman majority was made up of

five separate opinions; but at the core of each of them was
this principle:
The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot
tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death
under legal systems that permit this unique
penalty to be wantonly and .
. freakishly
imposed.
Icl.

~08

u.s.

at 310 (concurring opinion of

t-1r.

Justice Stewart;
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the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are violated if
the death penalty is exacted with great
infrequency even for the most atrocious
crimes and .
. there is no meaningful
basis for distinguishing the few cases
in which it is imposed from any cases in
which it is not.
Id.

at 408 U.S. 313 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White).

Furman therefore stands for the proposition that the arbitrary
and capricious application of the death penalty violates the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments--and its prohibition extends
to any form of "arbitrary and capricious exercise" of "the
power to determine which first-degree murderers shall live
and which shall die."
303 (1976)

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,

(plurality opinion).

"The basic concern of Furman

centered on tr,r;se defendants who are being condemned to death
capriciously and arbitrarily."

Id. at 428 U.S. 303 (concurrinc

opinions of Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens).

To explore

that concern the Court there looked to the actual pattern of
imposition of the sentence of death under the statutes it was
examining.

See Furman v. Georgia, supra

at 408 U.S. 256-257

(concurring opinion of Justice Brennan), 309-310 (concurring
opinion of Justice Stewart), 311-314 (concurring opinion of
Justice White).
The generalities of the law inflicting
capital punishment is one thing. b'hat
may be said o~ the validity of a law on
the books and \'lhat may be ,:one with the
law in its application do or may lead to
quite different conclusions.
Id.at 408 U.S. 242 (concurring opinion o£ Justice Douglas).
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In Gregg v. Georgia, supra, and several companion
cases, the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of three
of five capital sentencing statutes before it "on their
face .

Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251 (1976).

(plurality opinion).

To the extent the Court examined the

actual administration of the death penalty under those

statut~s,

it found nothing in the records before it to support any
claim or arbitrariness and discrimination in fact.

See Gregg

v. Georgia, supra at 428 U.S. 222, 224, 225; Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262, 279 (1976). The Court explicitly stated it
could not consider claims of arbitrariness "unsupported by
any facts," or assume other than proper actions or motives
"absent facts to the contrary .

Gregg v. Georgia,

supra at 428 U.S. 225 (plurality opinion).

Furman's

essential ci7tate that death sentences could not constitutionally be dispensed in an arbitrary, rare and uneven fashion
under any kind of sentencing system thus clearly survived
Gregg.
303.

See Woodson v. North Carolina, supra at 428 U.S. 302Appellant's claim here was that this dictate had been

violated under this Utah law and in his case.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
cannot be granted unless it appears to a certainty that the
claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of
facts that could be proven in support of his claim.

Liquor

Control Co~~- v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 441, 443 (1952).
Clearly, under Furman, and under the most basic law of equal
protection, proof of the fact that a person's life is being
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taken as part of a pattern of discriminatory deprivation of
life on the basis of race would entitle that person
relief.

to

Appellant has alleged and does allege that his life

is being taken in this manner--that because he is black and
his victims were white, because he is an outsider and his
victims were Utah residents, because he was poor and his
victims were prominent he has been condemned to die where
others convicted of crimes of similar gravity but not
sharing his disadvantages were not.
17-18; Amended Petition at 8-9.

See Trans. 11/30/78 at

Such allegations

assert

the most fundamental kind of equal protection violation.
Under no constitutional theory can they be dismissed as a
matter of 12''-'.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons the District Court's
Order dismissing the Petition in this case and denying a
stay of execution, should be reversed and the case should
be remanded for the full briefing and evidentiary hearing
to which Petitioner was entitled.
Respectfully submitted,

~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
_"')Q_

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I personally served a copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant on the Office of the Attorney
General for the State of Utah, Attorney for Respondent
Lawrence Morris, State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, this

~~of

February, 1979.

1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

